


Self-Reference and Self-Knowledge

Spring 2018, Syracuse University
Co-taught by Kim Frost and Michael Rieppel



Course Description

The paradigmatic expression of self-consciousness in English is the first person pronoun ‘I’. First-personal language and thought is commonly taken to be *sui generis*, irreducible to language or thought not containing the first-person pronoun or corresponding concept. In this seminar we will explore this topic from the crossroads of philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, and epistemology. We will read classic texts by Frege, Anscombe, Perry, Lewis, and Evans among others, as well as a variety of more recent works on the topic.

In preparation for the first seminar meeting, please read Frege’s ‘The Thought’. You should also be familiar with Frege’s ‘On Sense and Reference’. (Both articles are available on Blackboard.)

Contact Information

Please CC both of us on seminar-related correspondence.

	Kim Frost	Michael Rieppel
Email:	kcfrost@syr.edu	morieppe@syr.edu
Office Hours:	Mo 1–2, We 1–2	Mo 3:30–5:30

Course Requirements

Seminar attendees are required to post a question or critical comment about the reading(s) to the Blackboard discussion forum each week (please post your comment by the evening before the seminar). Turning up regularly to discuss the readings is a requirement to pass the class. (We will let you know if you are in danger of failing either of these requirements.) Default assessment is based around one term paper plan, due Wednesday April 18 (three weeks before end of semester), and a 20–25 page paper term paper due Wednesday May 9 (last day of class). We will distribute a guide as to what's required in the term paper plan closer to the due date.

Alternative assessment in the form of a pair of shorter papers (around 10–12 pages in length) is also possible. Talk to Mike or Kim before 31st January to get permission to do an alternative assessment.

Tentative Schedule

Week 1 Historical background, and setting the Fregean stage.

- Frege, G. (1892). 'On Sense and Reference'. In Geach, P. and Black, M., editors, *Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege*, pages 56–78. Basil Blackwell, 1960
- Frege, G. (1918, 1956). The Thought: a Logical Inquiry. *Mind*, 65(259):189–311

Week 2 Perry-ology

- Perry, J. (1977). Frege on Demonstratives. *Philosophical Review*, 86(4):474–497
- Perry, J. (1979). The Problem of the Essential Indexical. *Noûs*, 13(1):3–21

Week 3 Evans

- Evans, G. (1981). Understanding Demonstratives. In Parret, H. and Bouvresse, J., editors, *Meaning and Understanding*, volume 291–321. Walter de Gruyter
- Perry, J. (2000). Afterword to 'Frege on Demonstratives'. In *The Problem of the Essential Indexical: and Other Essays*, pages 21–26. CSLI Publications

Week 4 Anscombe

- Anscombe, G. (1975). The First Person. In Guttenplan, S., editor, *Mind & Language: Wolfson College Lectures*, pages 45–65. Clarendon Press, Oxford
- Wiseman, R. (forthcoming). What am I and What am I Doing? *Journal of Philosophy*

Week 5 Shoemaker

- Shoemaker, S. (1968). Self-Reference and Self-Awareness. *Journal of Philosophy*, 65(October):555–567
- Pryor, J. (1999). Immunity to Error Through Misidentification. *Philosophical Topics*, 26(1/2):271–304

Week 6 *De se* skepticism: against Lewis.

- Magidor, O. (2015). The Myth of the *De Se*. *Philosophical Perspectives*, 29:249–283
- Lewis, D. (1979). Attitudes De Dicto and De Se. *The Philosophical Review*, 88(4):513–543

Week 7 *De se* skepticism: against Perry.

- Cappelen, H. and Dever, J. (2013). *The Inessential Indexical*. Oxford University Press, Oxford

Week 8 Replies to *de se* skeptics.

- Ninan, D. (2016). What is the Problem of *De Se* Attitudes? In Garcia-Carpintero, M. and Torre, S., editors, *About Oneself: De Se Attitudes and Communication*, pages 86–120. Oxford University Press

Week 9 Evans on self-identification.

- Evans, G. (1982). Self-Identification. In McDowell, J., editor, *The Varieties of Reference*. Oxford University Press, Oxford

Week 10 Bermúdez I

- Bermúdez, J. L. (2017). *Understanding ‘I’: Language and Thought*. Oxford University Press, Oxford
- Cappelen, H. and Dever, J. (2017). Review of José Bermúdez *Understanding ‘I’*. *Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews*

Week 11 Bermúdez II

- Bermúdez, J. L. (2017). *Understanding ‘I’: Language and Thought*. Oxford University Press, Oxford

Week 12 Bermúdez III

- Bermúdez, J. L. (2017). *Understanding 'I': Language and Thought*. Oxford University Press, Oxford

Week 13 Introducing Rödl

- Rödl, S. (2017a). Self-Consciousness, Negation, and Disagreement. *Proceedings of the Aristotelean Society*, 117(3):215–230
- Rödl, S. (2017b). The First Person and Self-Knowledge in Analytic Philosophy. In Renz, U., editor, *Self-Knowledge: a History*, pages 280–294. Oxford University Press

Week 14 Rödl's Absolute Idealism

- Rödl, S. (2018). *Self-Consciousness and Objectivity: an Introduction to Absolute Idealism*. Harvard University Press